In October 2010, the UK Parliament brought into effect law that replaced the partial defence to murder of provocation with a new partial defence of 'loss of control,' applicable to England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Although it retained some key features of its controversial predecessor, the new partial defence was in part designed better to address the gendered contexts within which a large number of homicides are committed. In examining the impact of the reforms, we will focus on long-held concerns about the treatment of sexual infidelity as a trigger for loss of control in murder cases. The article undertakes an analysis of English case law to evaluate the way in which sexual infidelity-related evidence has influenced perceptions of a homicide defendant's culpability, for the purposes of sentencing, both before and after the implementation of reform. The analysis reveals that, in sentencing offenders post reform, the higher courts have failed to follow the spirit of the reforms respecting the substantive law by effecting a corresponding change in sentencing practice. 
In examining the impact of the reforms, a key focus is how the operation of the new loss of control partial defence has addressed the long-held concerns just mentioned about the treatment of sexual infidelity, when it has led to homicide. The 2009 Act sought dramatically to reduce the relevance of sexual infidelity-related evidence as a basis for excusing murder, following a loss of self-control by the perpetrator. When words or conduct constituting sexual infidelity triggered the defendant's loss of self-control in killing the victim, the jury is now to disregard this evidence in deciding whether murder is to be reduced to manslaughter on the grounds of loss of control. 4 This article examines the implications of this legal change for sentencing in murder cases. In particular, we focus on post-2009 cases in which a jury rejected the loss of control plea and convicted of murder, where the sole or main evidence for the loss of control related to sexual infidelity. We argue that in sentencing offenders in the post-reform period, the higher courts have failed to carry forward the spirit of the reforms respecting the substantive law, by effecting a corresponding change in sentencing practice.
Disappointingly, the English higher courts have treated the change in the substantive law as a purely 'technical' one, relevant only to the legal grounds on which murder may or may not be reduced to manslaughter. They have not regarded the change as entailing or demanding a more general shift in moral thinking concerning the relative seriousness of murders committed in response to sexual infidelity-related evidence. In consequence, the courts have continued to regard evidence of sexual infidelity as in principle having the potential to constitute grave provocation, justifying a significantly lower minimum term of imprisonment in murder cases. We believe that this approach to sentencing wrongly ignores the spirit, if not the letter, of the change in the substantive law governing the relevance of evidence of sexual infidelity to the loss of control defence in murder cases.
II. SEXUAL INFIDELITY AND THE PARTIAL DEFENCE OF LOSS OF CONTROL
In English law, by virtue of reforms brought about by the 2009 Act, murder will be reduced to manslaughter, if the partial defence of 'loss of control' applies. To have this effect, section 54 of the 2009 Act requires amongst other things that the defendant's loss of control at the relevant time 5 must have had one of two qualifying triggers. 6 A qualifying trigger has two 4 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 55(6)(c). This is a loose statement of the legal position, more detail on which will be given shortly. 5 In theory, this may not always be the exact time of the killing. Loss of self-control, like diminished responsibility, is available to complicit parties, whose contribution (as by encouragement or assistance) following a loss of self-control may precede the killing.
infidelity" as a potential source of something "done or said" that might meet the qualifying trigger condition. Section 55(6)(c) stipulates that, when deciding if a 'qualifying trigger' is present, "the fact that a thing said or done constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded".
In justifying the inclusion of this exclusionary section in the new partial defence, and in distancing the new law from the problems associated with its predecessor (the provocation defence), at the time of its introduction the Ministry of Justice commented:
The Government does not accept that sexual infidelity should ever provide the basis for a partial defence to murder. We therefore remain committed to making it clearon the face of statute -that sexual infidelity should not provide an excuse for killing. 8 This provision clearly has important implications for the scope of the loss of control defence to murder in law, some of which have been explored by the Court of Appeal in England 9 as well as by commentators. 10 It has been held by the Court of Appeal that the provision does 6 There are other requirements to be met, if the defence is to be successful, but they are not relevant here. ran no further than saying, 'I lost control and killed her when she admitted adultery', the jury would be obliged to disregard the admission as evidence of a qualifying trigger. 12 On the other hand, if the defendant were to say, 'It was when she admitted having had an affair with my 14-year-old son that I lost control and killed her', the position would be different. In the latter kind of example, in the words of the Court of Appeal:
[evidence of] sexual infidelity is integral to and forms an essential part of the context in which to make a just evaluation whether a qualifying trigger properly falls within the ambit of subsections 55(3) and (4).
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This brief discussion of the relevant provisions within the new defence provides the legal background that frames the main focus of our analysis: an examination of the implications of section 55(6)(c) for sentencing in murder cases where a defendant has killed in response to prolonged family violence, or where the lethal violence was preceded by an act (actual or alleged) of sexual infidelity. As this analysis is closely tied to and influenced by sentencing patterns for homicide offences in England and Wales, we will start with a broader examination of the sentencing regime for murder, as it affects abused women, rather than jealous and violent male partners. 
III. SENTENCING IN MURDER CASES: THE INVISIBLE ABUSED WOMAN
Following a murder conviction in England and Wales, the trial judge must impose the mandatory life sentence, and within that, a minimum term in prison that the offender must serve before being considered for release.
14 In setting this term, the trial judge must bear in mind (aside from time already spent in custody) the seriousness of the offence and of any others associated with it, and the guidelines on sentence lengths in murder cases provided by and mitigating factors to be taken into account so far as these were not already considered when determining the starting point. It is not necessary to set out the entirety of Schedule 21
here, but some key points should be mentioned.
To begin with, the starting points are largely determined by a combination of two factors: the defendant's age at the time of the offence, and the presence (or absence) of key aggravating factors. So, for example, at the top end of the scale, if the offender was over 21
years' old at the time of the offence, and the judge considers the seriousness of the offence(s)
to be "exceptionally high" the right starting point is a whole life order. 16 At the other end of the starting point scale, if the offender was under 18 at the time of the offence, the appropriate starting point is 12 years' imprisonment. Other than age, it is significant that there is no starting point in Schedule 21 dictated by a mitigating factor. So, for example, that the defendant acted in fear of serious violence (but had not lost their control at the time of the killing, and was thus not eligible to plead the loss of control partial defence) will not in itself justify a lower starting point. Schedule 21(11)(e), establishes merely that mitigating factors that 'may be relevant' once the starting point has been determined include, alongside evidence of mental disorder or disability (11(c)), "the fact that the offender acted to any extent in self-defence or in fear of violence". This arguably very weak attempt to take into account circumstances that will include those in which abused women may kill their abusive partners hardly matches the effort devoted to carving out a partial defence to murder based, In examining the negative impact that this approach to sentencing for murder in England and
Wales is likely to have on women who kill an abuser, despite attempts to reform homicide law to better cater to this unique category of defendant, a consideration of past cases is useful.
In the well-known case of Ahluwalia, 18 for example, the female defendant -a victim of very serious abuse over a long period at the hands of her husband -took a can of petrol that she had stored in a garage, and set light to him, killing him. She was initially convicted of murder, although the conviction was quashed and a re-trial ordered following the emergence of new evidence that severe depression had affected her actions. On retrial, the prosecution accepted her plea of diminished responsibility. Her original tariff sentence for murder was set at 12 years, surprisingly high given the circumstances of the offence. Her sentence for manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility on re-trial was set at three years and four months. scene of the crime with a view to using it to commit not just any offence but murder. 
A. Sentencing Practices and Judicial Attitudes Prior to the 2003 Act
You could be forgiven for thinking the further back in time one goes, the more lenient one is likely to find the treatment by judges of men provoked to kill by, in some form, the sexual infidelity of (ex) partners. This view finds superficial support in the well-known rule that for a man to catch his wife in the very act of adultery was provocation "exceeding great", 21 jealousy being, "the rage of the man" and adultery, "the highest invasion of property". 22 In fact, the later historical picture is more complex. Whilst the old view long persisted -and may still persist -in folk memory, Martin Weiner has argued that judges in the latter part of the 19 th century often defied popular opinion by adopting a hard line with such offenders.
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The Prisoners' Counsel Act of 1836 had, for the first time, allowed defence counsel not only to tackle matters of law, together with examining and cross-examining witnesses (both practices developed in the 18 th century), but also to address the jury in felony cases. 24 That led judges to seek to counter-balance this important pro-defendant influence by themselves becoming pro-prosecution and hence 'pro-authority', not least through the development of the power to sum up cases. 25 While this was an across-the-board development, it had particular implications for domestic homicide cases where a man had killed his wife or 32 In Holmes, the defendant killed his wife by strangulation, having subdued her with a blow from a hammer.
He had arranged to meet a lover shortly afterwards. According to his account (there was no corroboration), his wife had admitted being unfaithful to him at the time of the fatal quarrel.
In cross-examination, he admitted intending to kill his wife, following a, "loss of temper".
The judge refused to put the issue of provocation to the jury, and was later held to have been correct in law to refuse to do so. In a well-known passage, Viscount Simon held that:
[A] sudden confession of adultery without more can never constitute provocation of a sort which might reduce murder to manslaughter. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, the understanding that sexual infidelity related provocation could be grave provocation began to have more influence. This was not only because, from the implementation of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 onwards, words -however trivial a provocation they constituted -had to be put to the jury as provocation that might reduce murder to manslaughter. 34 We may also surmise that judges ceased to regard it as part of their role to act as moral educators as well as legal authorities, and hence no longer attempted to reduce, in summing up, the growing influence of sexual infidelity-related provocation on jury verdicts. 48 Ibid, para. 11. Rather weakly, the Sentencing Guidelines Council has done little to counter this approach in its sentencing guidelines, saying merely that, "discovery or knowledge of the fact of infidelity on the part of a partner does not necessarily amount to high provocation. The gravity of such provocation depends entirely on all attendant circumstances", see note 19 above, at para. 3.2.
individual jury's opinion in an individual case. 49 Indeed, that most judges value this role has been subject to empirical testing and verification.
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So far as we are concerned with the individual cases that were the subject matter of the Attorney General's reference, they provide (as we shall see) an instructive contrast, at least in some respects, to the approach more recently taken following the changes to sentencing principles in murder cases post-2003. Due to space constraints, only one of these cases can be considered in detail here. In the case of Humes, the defendant, a solicitor whose marriage was in difficulty because he was a workaholic, discovered that his wife (the eventual victim) was on intimate terms with her karate instructor. When Humes called at the family home (he had been staying at a hotel after the victim had asked him to leave), the victim told him that their relationship was finished and that she had switched her affections to another man. The defendant alleged that his wife said to him, "By the time you get back, in a week, I'll have slept with him". In response, Humes lost control and stabbed his wife 11 times with a bread knife, continuing his attack as she sought to escape from the kitchen to the dining room. Two of the stab wounds penetrated the victim's whole body, including the fatal wound which involved a double thrust through the heart and then the lung. Part of the attack was witnessed by the couple's eldest daughter (aged 14), who became covered in blood attempting to revive her mother, and by the other three children, aged between 12 and twoand-a-half. For reasons considered below, the prosecution accepted the defendant's offer of to plead guilty to manslaughter by reason of provocation.
The defendant's sentence of seven years' imprisonment was upheld by the Court of Appeal, which described the sentence as not even lenient, let alone unduly lenient. On the one hand, it was conceded that the judge had been entitled to regard as an aggravating factor the fact that the children had to witness such a brutal attack on their mother (one child removed the bread knife from the defendant's stomach when he stabbed himself following the attack), together with the impact on the victim's family, and on her twin sister in particular. That justified a sentence at the upper end of the normal five to seven year range. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal pointed to the stress that the defendant had been under at the time of the offence, that he had a good character and no previous history of violence, adding:
49 See, generally, Joseph Raz, "the courts are, or at least they should be, above the rough-and-tumble of everyday political pressures. They should be relatively immune to passing fashions. In constitutional matters, they may succeed in representing a lasting consensus…", in J. In accepting the offender's plea, the prosecutor did not dispute that the offender's loss of control was reasonable in all the circumstances and was sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity of the offence. We find it difficult to understand how consistently with that the degree of provocation can be said to be slight.
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With respect, this argument is technical and obfuscatory. It is true that the prosecution can accept a plea of guilty of manslaughter in such cases, if there is 'insufficient evidence' to press on with a murder charge. 52 However, in this case, the prosecution was no doubt moved to accept a plea of guilty because the defendant had agreed in exchange not to press a plea of diminished responsibility, and in part because to do so would avoid any prospect of the defendant's children having to appear as witnesses. As we will see, not only would such a case necessarily now end in a conviction for murder, but it would attract a minimum prison term greatly in excess of that which Humes was then expected to serve. Most disappointing of all is the Court of Appeal's steadfast refusal in the case to comment in any significant way on the sexual infidelity basis for the defendant's plea, and its determination instead, as a basis for mitigation, to hide behind the jury's (or the prosecution's) acceptance that all the elements of the provocation defence were or might have been present. As Mandy Burton argues, the appeal gave the Court, "a clear opportunity to state that jealousy should afford no mitigation;
however, their ruling implicitly approved the mitigation afforded to jealous men who kill".
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B. Sexual Infidelity Evidence and Sentencing post 2003
The new partial defence of loss of control, and specifically section 55 (6) 64 where the defendant strangled his former girlfriend after she refused to resume their relationship, a minimum term of 18 years' imprisonment was upheld in light of (amongst other things) the defendant's premeditated use of a belt to kill his estranged partner. 65 Furthermore, a murder committed in front of children of the family now seemingly counts as a more substantial aggravating factor than it was treated as being in Humes. In There are a number of aggravating features present…a history of violence…some evidence of sexual possessiveness by the offender; an invasion of the deceased's home at night; a prolonged, determined and persistent beating; the presence of the young child at the beating...We cannot guess the long-term damage that will have been caused....There is nothing in this case which can be said to amount in any way to provocation by the deceased or which would in any way serve to mitigate the offence.
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We take no stand on whether, in such cases, the minimum term is currently too harsh, or about right (or even, for some people perhaps, still too lenient). That issue aside, these remarks appear at first sight to constitute important evidence that infidelity-related evidence is now no longer the ground for substantial mitigation that it once was. In R v Haywood, 71 the defendant, 69, began a relationship with W, after his wife died.
He bought them a house together. W took a lover, and then a second lover and informed the defendant that she was going to set up home with her second lover. The defendant armed himself with an iron bar, and sought to disguise himself. He then fatally struck his partner's new lover several times on the head and neck as the victim was leaving work. On appeal, in justifying a reduction of the minimum term imposed from 11 years' imprisonment to nine, Aitkens LJ said:
There is no escape from the fact that, albeit under immense emotional strain, the appellant deliberately went to the hotel that evening, armed with an iron bar and dressed in a manner that he hoped would disguise him...However, the judge described carefully and properly, in our view, the emotional turmoil and the mental state of the appellant which...was none of his doing. That was not provocation such as to amount to a defence to murder because the jury rejected that defence. But, in our view, there was the greatest possible provocation in the non technical sense.
(emphasis added)
In our view, the strong element of premeditation in this case ought to have been regarded as largely nullifying the effect of any provocation; but our focus is the view taken by Aitken LJ Whilst, in a broad sense, this understanding of the law is correct, in our view, a reading more fully informed by a gendered perspective would have led to this understanding being modified in significant ways.
To begin with, it must be kept in mind that section 11(d) of Schedule 21, whilst referring to 'provocation,' appears to focus in point of mitigation neither on the gravity of the provocation offered, nor on the role of the victim in being provocative. Rather, the focus is placed on the role of the defendant's mental state in making him or her perhaps peculiarly susceptible to provocation. The example given is provocation producing, 'prolonged stress'.
We believe that this is a legislative steer towards an approach to the provocation issue in sentencing for murder that rightly places emphasis on the cumulative deleterious impact on the mind of repeated stressful events. In other words, it invites the sentencing judge to treat 73 It will be recalled that Schedule 21 includes as a mitigating feature the fact that, "the offender was provoked (for example by prolonged stress)". 74 [2012] 77 Of course, it will be said that the example of 'prolonged stress' given in section 11(d) is just that: an example, and an example that is only there to guide in any event; but, to repeat, our aim is to construct a gendered analysis of the applicable law, and so such objections will not detain us.
If this analysis is capable of gaining legal traction, then it opens up a new way of looking in principle at provocation-as-mitigation in murder cases post-2009. Central cases calling for mitigation will be those in which -and the drafters of section 11(d) of schedule 21 may well have had this in mind -women (or men) have suffered abuse at the hands of a partner or former partner over a long period, even though there was no loss of control at the time of the offence. 78 Whether or not such people can be described as suffering from a recognised medical condition, the enormously damaging mental effects caused by prolonged abuse are well-known. 79 By way of contrast, relegated to the mitigation periphery will be cases in which, whatever the supposed 'gravity' of the provocation, the defendant's response is aptly described in terms of a more or less spontaneous outburst of anger or rage, a reaction not attributable to the long-term build-up of stress. Perhaps some defendants who kill their (former) partners when their reaction is triggered by sexual infidelity-related evidence will claim to fall within the former category, when the infidelity-related conduct or words have been repeated over a long period and have had deleterious effects on their mental state in general. We suspect such cases will be very much in the minority; but this issue takes us back to the principal question: the relationship between section 55(6)(c) of the 2009 Act and sexual infidelity-related evidence as mitigating evidence in sentencing for murder. with a decision on the nature of the sentencing structure which is to be attached to the offences concerned" (our emphasis).
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One basis for such an approach can be found in section 55(6) itself. Alongside sexual infidelity-related evidence, also to be disregarded as a possible qualifying trigger is a fear of serious violence, if the violence itself was incited by the defendant (section 55(6)(a)). Further, a sense of being seriously wronged by something done or said is not to be regarded as justifiable -and hence a qualifying trigger -if the defendant him or herself incited the thing done or said (section 55(6)(b)). The latter rule, in particular, changed the common law, which had previously permitted evidence of 'self-induced' provocation at trial. 85 Little, if any, credit in point of mitigation at the sentencing stage is likely ever to be given to a defendant who him or herself engineered an opportunity to take offence, worked themselves into a rage, and then killed in response to that offence. 86 Accordingly, judges should adopt the holistic view that the placement of sexual infidelity-related evidence directly alongside self-induced losses of self-control in section 55(6) has implications not only for the directions given to juries, but also for sentencing in all such cases. The grouping together of these kinds of so-called sexual infidelity-related evidence, as such, to insignificance: that is to the level of 'selfinduced' and/or incited losses of self-control.
In introducing the legislation, whilst the Government of the day placed some emphasis, in explaining section 55(6)(c), on the narrow effect it was to have on the substantive law, 87 Claire Ward MP went on to say:
The provision does not reflect a lack of trust in the jury; what it does reflect is the Government's determination to ensure that the law in this matter keeps pace with the times. In this day and age, it should not be possible for any person, regardless of gender or sexuality, to stand up in court and blame their partner -let us not forget that it is the partner that they themselves have killed -for having brought on their own death by having an affair.
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This passage is not, of course, a piece of legislation in itself. Even so, we believe it is right to give a broad meaning to Ward's words when she speaks of the need to ensure that the law keeps pace 'with the times'. That can be and should be taken to indicate that judges must adjust their sentencing philosophy to match that which now shapes the substantive law.
Further, when Ward says that it should not be possible for anyone to, "stand up in court and blame" a partner for having brought about their own death by engaging in sexual infidelity, this should be understood as a general moral claim about homicide trials, not just an indication of the Government's reasoning in relation to a particular substantive law provision.
Ward's words can perfectly justifiably be understood as rightly applicable to the sentencing stage of the criminal process as much as to the process of reaching a verdict. In this respect, her words can also be construed as a source of implicit guidance to the effect that sexual infidelity-related evidence should have no bearing on mitigation in murder cases in virtue of the application of section 55(6)(c), except in so far as it is part and parcel of a -necessarily evidence as capable of amounting to, "the greatest possible provocation". On the contrary, in our view, such an approach is likely to come to be regarded as running directly contrary to the Government's overall philosophy in this long-controversial area of the law of homicide.
In saying this, of course, we are implicitly endorsing the view that public policy considerations (such as the comparative treatment of men and women by criminal law and in sentencing) should play a highly significant role in influencing decisions on sentence in murder cases, notwithstanding the importance of personal mitigating factors in an individual case. In that, we simply follow the 6 th Report of the House of Commons Justice Committee in relation to the sentencing of persons who kill in response to prolonged family violence, significant steps need to be taken to soften its impact in many cases, so that justice can be better achieved. However, in our view, the treatment of evidence of sexual infidelity-related evidence (almost always on the part of a female partner) as in principle capable of amounting to grave provocation is not a legitimate way to achieve this necessary softening effect. That approach simply threatens the integrity of the moral message that the change in the law in 2009 was in broad terms meant to bring about.
The importance of this analysis is that it highlights the difficulty of achieving meaningful reform to the law of homicide, without also considering the likely impact of sentencing legislation on the success of those reforms in practice. For this reason, and beyond the English context, we emphasise the importance of an approach to reform which considers not only the substantive law of homicide but also sentencing legislation and guidance. This is essential when attempting to overcome pervasive gender biases in the law's operation, such as those that have come to be associated in many jurisdictions with the controversial partial defence of 'provocation' or loss of control. Without such a holistic approach, it appears likely that any attempt to achieve meaningful change in practice at one stage may be undermined by a lack of consideration of the need for change at the other stage.
